WILL THE VOLUNTARY CHECKOFF PROGRAM BE THE ANSWER? AN ANALYSIS OF OPTIMAL ADVERTISING AND FREE-RIDER PROBLEM IN THE U.S. BEEF INDUSTRY by Chung, Chanjin et al.
Will the Voluntary Checkoff Program be the Answer?  An Analysis of 

















*The manuscript is prepared for the presentation at the Southern Agricultural Economics 
Association Meetings in Tulsa, Oklahoma, February 14-18, 2004.  Support from the 
National Institute for Commodity Promotion Research and Evaluation is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
 
**Chanjin Chung is assistant professor and Emilio Tostao is research assistant in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics at Oklahoma State University. 
 Will the Voluntary Checkoff Program be the Answer?  An Analysis of Optimal 










This study develops a framework for the analysis of optimal advertising and free-rider 
problem.  Previous studies in the literature were extended in two ways.  First, the new 
framework allows retailer’s oligopsony power separately from processor’s market power. 
Second, to examine the free-rider problem, we introduce the trade component to the 
model and divide domestic producers into two groups: participating producers and non-
participating producers in the possible voluntary program.  The free-rider problem is 
measured as the amount of domestic price decrease due to the increased production from 
importers and non-participating producers.  Simulation results for the U.S. beef industry 
indicate that the industry has under-invested in advertising and promotion, and the 
possible voluntary program is expected to further under-invest in these programs.  As a 
result, producers are likely to lose 25 to 85 percent of current promotion benefits.  The 





Will the Voluntary Checkoff Program be the Answer?  An Analysis of Optimal 
Advertising and Free-Rider Problem in the U.S. Beef Industry 
  2 
The beef checkoff program began in 1987 and has collected $1 for each head of cattle 
marketed in the U.S. and a $1 per head equivalent fee for the imported beef.  The 
mandatory beef checkoff program has recently faced the constitutional challenge.  Since 
the mandatory checkoff fees are used for collective advertising and promotion efforts, 
some have argued this violates individual’s right to free speech.  There have been many 
litigations on this issue and the Supreme Court is expected to rule soon.  If the court rules 
against it, the mandatory checkoff will be eliminated.  Despite these lawsuits against the 
beef checkoff program, according to a recent survey by the Cattlemen’s Beef Promotion 
and Research Board, almost two-thirds of beef cattle and dairy cattle producers support 
the current program.  The survey result and the general consensus in the beef industry 
strongly indicate that some type of voluntary program would emerge if the court 
eliminates the mandatory program.  Immediate questions surrounding the possible 
voluntary program include: If the program changes from mandatory to voluntary 
participation, can the collected checkoff funds be large enough to finance the ongoing 
advertising and promotion programs?  Will this spending in advertising and promotion be 
optimal in markets where retail and processing sectors are imperfectly competitive?  
What would be the extent of the expected free-rider problem?  To our knowledge, no 
study has addressed these questions for the beef industry. 
  The objective of this study is to examine optimal advertising and free-rider 
problem in the U.S. beef industry under a possible voluntary checkoff program.  The 
study analyzes whether the collected checkoff funds will be sufficient enough to reach 
the optimal advertising expenditure in markets where retailers and processors exercise 
  3oligopoly and oligopsony power.  Furthermore, the study estimates the extent of free-
ridership gained by domestic producers and importers.  There will be a free-rider problem 
when some of domestic producers benefit from generic advertising programs without 
paying checkoff dollars, and a similar problem will occur when importers do not pay 
checkoff fees voluntarily.  Data from the past five years (1998-2002) demonstrate that 
U.S. imports an average annual amount of over $2 billion beef (fresh, chilled, frozen) 
from various sources mainly Canada and Australia.  The imports account for about ten 
percent of total domestic consumption.   
  Several studies have examined optimal investment in advertising (e.g., Dofman 
and Steiner; Goddard and McCutcheon; Zhang and Sexton; Kinnucan).  Although the 
results of these studies have varied under alternative market structures, a basic concept of 
analytical derivations has been that the optimality of advertising investment is a function 
of total sales, elasticities of demand, supply, and advertising, and opportunity cost of 
alternative investments.  We will develop an optimal advertising model with 
consideration of trade and imperfectly competitive market structure in processing and 
retail sectors.  In particular, the new model will take into account both upstream and 
downstream (i.e., oligopsony and oligopoly) competitions in retail sector. 
  Simulation results for the U.S. beef industry indicate that the industry has under-
invested in advertising and promotion programs, and the possible voluntary program is 
expected to further under-invest in these programs.  As a result, producers are likely to 
lose 25 to 85 percent of current advertising/promotion benefits.  The free-riding from 
non-participating producers would lower market price by 5 to 20 percent. 
Review of Previous Studies on Optimal Commodity Advertising  
  4Several studies have examined optimal investment levels in advertising under various 
market conditions.  Dorfman and Steiner (DS) generated conditions for optimal 
advertising intensity under a monopoly market structure, holding quantity produced 
fixed. They showed that for a monopolist, the optimality condition for joint price and 
advertising expenditure is characterized by the equality of the ratio of advertising-to-sales 
with the ratio of the advertising elasticity of demand divided by the absolute price 
elasticity of demand.  When quantity is held constant, the optimal advertising rule 




−= , i.e., the ratio of the 
advertising elasticity to the price elasticity equals to the ratio of the advertising to sales 
(here P and Q represent sales price and quantity, respectively).  When price is fixed, DS 
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=− , optimal rules from two 
cases: fixed supply and fixed price are the same.   
A A
  Goddard and McCutcheon (GM) derived the optimal advertising rule for the case 
where both quantity and price are not controlled.  The study argued that in the fluid milk 
markets of Ontario and Quebec, it might not be realistic to assume that either producer 
price or quantity is fixed when the use of advertising expenditures are optimized.  
Following the same framework that DS used, but allowing both price and quantity vary in 
response to the effective advertising, they found that the optimal advertising rule should 
be the same whether quantity is assumed fixed or whether quantity and price are allowed 
to adjust to advertising.   
  5  Nerlove and Waugh (NW) also noted that advertising programs could be 
implemented in a competitively industry without controlling supply quantity or price.  
NW argued that previous derivations in particular, in DS, were based on the assumption 
that producers had no alternatives for the use of collected funds spent on advertising, 
which led to the first order condition for the producer’s profit maximization condition 
with respect to advertising equaled zero.  Recognizing alternative uses of these funds 
such as buying government bonds, NW equated the marginal returns to the rate of return 
on alternative forms of investment ρ.  The corresponding optimal rule from NW is 
() ( 1 ) P PQ εη ρ −+
= , where ε is the supply elasticity. 
A A η
Kinnucan, with the objective of determining the optimal advertising to sales ratio, 
investigates the impact of food industry market power on farmers’ incentives to promote. 
The study assumes that farm output and food industry technology is characterized by 
variable proportions, middlemen possess market power, and advertising funds are raised 
through a per-unit assessment on farm output.  Kinnucan concludes that although market 
power tends to reduce promotion incentives, this decrease in incentives is moderated by 
factor substitution.  
Zhang and Sexton (ZC) recognize that the conditions that characterize optimal 
advertising intensity under perfect competition for advertising funds do not generally 
hold when marketing is imperfectly competitive.  ZC investigate the optimal collection 
and expenditure of funds for agricultural commodity promotion for markets where the 
processing and distribution sectors exhibit oligopoly and/or oligopsony power.  More 
specifically, their study examines the impact of imperfect competition on the level of 
funds to be collected and expended on a commodity-advertising program.  It is concluded 
  6from their study that although an imperfectly competitive food marketing sector captures 
a portion of the benefits generated from commodity advertising, it also bears a share of 
the costs under funding by a per-unit tax or check-off.  They further conclude that the 
condition for optimal advertising intensity that was developed by DS does not in general 
apply in the presence of downstream oligopoly power.  Unless advertising makes the 
demand more elastic, downstream oligopoly power reduces the optimal advertising 
intensity below the level specified by DS.  If advertising makes retail demand less elastic, 
it will increase the oligopoly distortion in the market, which may be harmful to producers 
as it reduces farm sales.  
 
Model 
To develop a framework for the optimal advertising rule and the free-rider problem, we 
extend previous studies, in particular, Zhang and Sexton, and Kinnucan in two ways.  
First, the new framework allows retailer’s oligopsony power separately from processor’s 
market power.  Many studies have typically assumed an integrated processing/retailing 
sector so that upstream and down stream market power of the integrated sector can be 
conveniently derived from processor’s profit maximization problem (e.g., Azzam; 
Holloway; Zhang and Sexton; and Kinnucan).  However, this type of modeling does not 
take into account the effect of market power in retailing sector.  Several studies in the 
literature found that the observed food price depends on relative degree of market power 
of processors and retailers (e.g., Binkley and Connor; Richards et al.; Digal and Ahmadi-
Esfahani).  To account for the effect of market power at the retail sector, profit 
maximization conditions for three sectors (retailing, processing, and farm) are 
  7simultaneously solved and the equilibrium conditions are incorporated in a multi-
equation model.  Second, to determine the potential free-rider problem, we introduce the 
trade component to the model and divide domestic producers into two groups: 
participating producers and non-participating producers in the probable voluntary 
program.  The free-rider problem would be measured as the amount of domestic price 
decrease due to the increased production from importers and non-participating producers.  
  Therefore, the new framework developed in this study includes equilibrium 
conditions of each production stage with consideration of trade and imperfectly 
competitive market structures in both retailing and processing sectors.  We first define a 
set of market equilibrium conditions and derive marginal effects of a change in 
assessment rate (t) on equilibrium prices and quantities.  Then, the optimal advertising 
rule and the free-riding problem are determined from the derived marginal effects using 
conditions of producer surplus maximization. 
    Consider a three-sector model where retailing and processing sectors are 
imperfectly competitive in both raw material and output markets, and farm sector is 
perfectly competitive in output market.  In this framework, retailers and processors 
exercise oligopsony (or monopsony) power procuring their raw materials while they also 
exercise market power in selling their products.  Let YY , and   , 
where Y
f is the aggregate quantity at farm level, Y
a is domestic production of firms 
participating in the voluntary check off program, Y
n is domestic production of firms not 
participating in the voluntary check off program, Y
m is the quantity imported, A is the 
advertising expenditure (assuming all collected money is utilized for adverting), and t is 
the per-unit tax on domestic production and imports.  Assuming constant return to scale 
f anm Y Y =++ At Y =
  8in the food processing technology and fixed proportions with Leontief coefficient 1 in 
converting from farm to retail products results in YY , where Y
rpf Y Y ===
)] ( , [ t A P D Y
r =
n Y
r  and Y
p are 
aggregate product quantities at retail and processing level, respectively.  Then, the market 
equilibrium is defined by the following set of equations,  
(1)   , retail demand, 
) , ( t P S Y
f d d = (2)   , domestic supply from both participating and nonparticipating 
producers, i.e.,  ;  
da YY =+
) , ( t P S Y
r m m = (3)  , imported supply, and 







f  are prices at retailing, processing, and farm level. 
(5)  , identity relating domestic supply of participating and 
nonparticipating producers; 
Y Y Y + =
r p r r
y y m t Y P y t Y P Max ] ) , ( [ ) , (     + − = π
(6)   A = tY(Y
d , Y
m), is the advertising expenditure. Note that nonparticipating 
producers do not pay the check off tax t. 
 Considering  n
r identical retailers, i.e., Y = n
ry
r, we have a representative retailer’s 




 m represent finished product sales and constant marketing cost per unit for 
the representative retailer, respectively.  The first order condition to the retailer’s problem 
with respect to y
r can be expressed as 
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Rearranging the first order condition leads to 
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where   and   are conjectural elasticities 
reflecting degree of competition among retailers in selling finished product (ξ) and 
procuring processed product (ω), respectively;   and 
are total price elasticity and elasticity of supply for processors. 
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Considering n
p identical processors, i.e., Y = n
py
p, a representative processors’ 




 c represent processed product sales to retailers and constant processing cost 
per unit for the representative processor, respectively; and W
P is the price paid by 
processors, and the relationship between W
P and P
f is represented by W .  The 
first order condition of the processor’s problem is 
0
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which can be rewritten in elasticity form as 
(8)  
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where the conjectural elasticity,  , and   
represent degree of competition among processors in procuring farm product and selling 
processed product,   is supply elasticities at farm level.  
Substituting equation (8) in equation (7) results in  
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To get the optimum advertising rule, we totally differentiate equations (1), (2), 
(3), (4), (5) and (9) with respect to t and obtain 
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In elasticity form, equation (15) can be rewritten as 
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, .  EH,t  represents the 
  11percentage change in total demand elasticity H in response to 1 % increase in advertising 
assessment t.    and   represent the percentage change in supply elasticities in 
farm and processing sectors in response to 1 percent increase in advertising assessment t, 
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Then, from equation (16), marginal effects of change in t on domestic supply (Y
d) and 
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To derive optimal advertising rule, we consider producers’ producer surplus 
maximization problem that would decide the per-unit assessment rate t and consequently 
advertising expenditure.   
(19)    
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where S and P
f(0) are the farm supply curve and its intercept value, respectively.  Then, 
the first order condition of equation (19) gives 





















The optimal tax condition from equation (20) is 




















1, and  applying the optimal tax condition in 
equation (21) to the matrix (16), we have  




























Rearranging equation (22) and writing it in elasticity form results in optimal advertising 
rule: 
  13(23)  )] 1 ( [
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 is the import elasticity;
m S
Y
τ =  is the share of 
imports from total consumption.  Equation (23) is similar to Zhang and Sexton’s optimal 
advertising rule when an integrated retail and processing sector is assumed and 
international trade is restricted to zero. 
The free-rider effect can be measured as the amount of farm price decrease due to 
the increased production from non-participating producers.  The free-riding effect can be 
examined from the equilibrium conditions in matrix (16).  The marginal effect of 
changing t on producer price is 






























After rearranging terms and expressing it in elasticity form, equation (24) can be 
rewritten as: 




P t H P
Y
dt
dP η η ξ
η η
τ






























) 1 )( 1 (
)] 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 (
/ 1




















− − + + −
+
+ +
= Θ  
 
As the current mandatory program changes to a voluntary program, we expect at least 
importers would be nonparticipating.  Equation (24′) suggests that the increase in farm 
  14price due to advertising tax,  dt dP
f , would increase without imports, i.e.  m η = 0, with an 
assumption that (1 H / ξ + ) > 0.  In other words, participating producers face lower price 
due to the increased supply provided by importers.  If   H / ξ <-1 then it is not 
straightforward to predict the sign of  dt dP
f with zero imports analytically.  The extent 
of free-rider problem, caused by .importers and nonparticipating producers will be 
estimated via numeric simulations. 
 
Application to the U.S. Beef Industry 
This section provides results from numeric simulations for impacts of possible voluntary 
checkoff program on the U.S. beef industry.  Based on the optimal advertising rule in 
equation (23), we first examine if the advertising expenditures under the voluntary 
checkoff program would be optimal.  If advertising programs under the voluntary 
checkoff program would be under-invested, the potential loss of producer benefit due to 
the decreased advertising budget would be estimated.  Finally, the free-riding problem is 
numerically illustrated. 
   Table 1 lists parameters used for the numeric simulations.  Most of the parameters 
are obtained from previous studies.  Parameters in table 1 are applied to Equation (23), 
and advertising intensities, advertising-sales ratios, derived from a range of parameters 
are reported in table 2.  Results in table 2 indicate that beef industry would be under-
invested under the voluntary programs.  The simulated optimal advertising intensities are 
mostly much greater than current advertising intensity, 0.0005.  Case 1 assumes 
competitive retail and processing sectors without consideration of trade.  Results show 
that the optimal advertising intensity increases as advertising effectiveness increases 
  15while it decreases as demand is more elastic.  Case 2 considers imperfectly competitive 
retail and processing sectors.  Since processor’s market power is not relevant to the 
estimation of advertising intensity in equation (23), only retailer’s oligopoly power is 
considered.  As retail market is more imperfectly competitive, the optimal advertising 
intensity becomes smaller.  Case 3 includes both market power and trade parameters .  
The optimal advertising intensity decreases as import supply elasticity becomes more 
elastic.  A few cases where advertising elasticity is extremely small and import supply 
elasticity is highly elastic with a imperfectly competitive retail market results in lower 
optimal advertising intensity than current advertising-sales ratio. 
  To conduct numeric simulations on impacts of the voluntary checkoff program on 
producer benefit, we introduce linear functional forms for retail demand and farm supply 
functions while assuming perfectly elastic supply function for processing sector.  Linear 
retail demand and farm supply functions are: 
r r P A a Y α γ − + =     
 
d f Y b P β − =     
 
Applying these demand and supply functions to profit maximization problems for 
retailer, processor, and producer results in   
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Normalizing price and quantity without advertising in competitive retail and processing 
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  16(25) results in the solution Y
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For the linear functional forms of demand and supply functions, producer benefit 
from advertising can be measured as the change in producer surplus as 
(27)     
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Applying parameters in table 1 to equations (26) and (27), we estimate change in 
producer benefits for three different levels of participation rates, 55%, 70%, and 85%, 
and results are reported in tables 3 and 4.  Table 3 presents changes in producer benefits 
due to voluntary program with no consideration of trade and market power in retailing 
and processing sectors.  Results indicate that producers may lose 27 to 73 percent of 
current advertising benefit, and the extent of loss increases as the advertising 
effectiveness increases.  When market power and trade parameters are incorporated in the 
model, the expected producer loss increases as the retailing and processing market power 
increases.  For example, when retailing and processing sectors are highly non-
competitive, i.e., ξ=θ=0.5, the expected producer loss reaches to 64 to 86 percent of 
current benefit.  Finally, table 5 reports the amount of farm price decrease due to the 
increased production from non-participating producers.  The free-riding problem 
diminishes as market power in retailing and processing sectors increases.  Results show 
that the free-riding from non-participating producers would lower market price by 5 to 20 
  17percent.  
 
Discussions and Conclusions  
This study develops a framework for the analysis of optimal advertising and free-rider 
problem.  Previous studies in the literature were extended in two ways.  First, the new 
framework allows retailer’s oligopsony power separately from processor’s market power.  
Second, to examine the free-rider problem, we introduce the trade component to the 
model and divide domestic producers into two groups: participating producers and non-
participating producers in the possible voluntary program.  Then, the free-rider problem 
was measured as the amount of domestic price decrease due to the increased production 
from importers and non-participating producers.  
  The optimal advertising rule derived in this study indicates that as retailer’s 
oligopoly power increases the optimal advertising level decreases.  The oligopsony power 
is not relevant to the determination of optimal advertising intensity, which is consistent 
with Zhang and Sexton.  The optimal advertising rule also suggests that as import supply 
elasticity becomes more elastic, the optimal intensity decreases.  The newly derived rule 
is consistent with Dorfman and Steiner in which as demand elasticity is more elastic, the 
optimal advertising intensity decreases, while the intensity increases as the advertising  
effectiveness increases.   
  Simulation results for the U.S. beef industry indicate that the industry has under-
invested in advertising and promotion programs except a few cases where advertising 
effectiveness is extremely low (0.0005), the degree of imperfect competition is 
exceptionally high (0.3),  
  18and import supply elasticity is highly elastic (higher than 5).  The possible voluntary 
program is expected to further under-invest in advertising and promotion programs, and 
as a result, producers are likely to lose 25 to 85 percent of current promotion benefits.  
The free-riding from non-participating producers would lower market price by 5 to 20 
percent. 
 
  19Footnotes 
 
     1.  We assume a horizontal supply curve at the  processing sector and advertising has no 
impact on changing slopes of supply curves at both farm and processing sectors. 
  2.  Current advertising expenditures include dollars spent in advertising and promotion 
programs in 2001.  Hogan reports that the data is obtained from annual financial reports 
from Cattlemen’s Beef Promotion and Research Board. 
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Table 2.  Optimal Advertising Intensity 
 
Case 1.  No Trade in Competitive Market 
Parameters Intensity 
     ηA= 0.0005     ηP= -0.282  0.0018 
                            ηP= -0.450  0.0011 
  
     ηA= 0.012       ηP= -0.282  0.0426 
                            ηP= -0.450  0.0267 
  
     ηA= 0.05         ηP= -0.282  0.1773 
                            ηP= -0.450  0.1111 
  
Case 2.  No trade in imperfectly competitive market 
Parameters Intensity 
     ηA= 0.0005      ηP= -0.282 
  
     ζ= 0.1  0.0009 
     ζ= 0.223  0.0007 
     ζ= 0.3  0.0004 
  
     ηA= 0.012      ηP=-0.282 
     ζ= 0.1  0.276 
     ζ= 0.223  0.0093 
     ζ= 0.3  0.0022 
  
Case 3.  Trade in imperfectly competitive market 
Parameters Intensity 
ηA= 0.0005      ηP= -0.282 
     ζ= 0.1   
          ηm=1 0.0009 
          ηm=2  0.0007 
          ηm=5 0.0004 
     ζ= 0.223   
          ηm=1 0.0003 
          ηm=2 0.0002 
          ηm=5 0.0001 
 
ηA= 0.012      ηP= -0.282 
     ζ= 0.1   
          ηm=1 0.0206 
          ηm=2  0.0165 
          ηm=5 0.0102 
     ζ= 0.223   
          ηm=1 0.0069 
          ηm=2 0.0055 
          ηm=5 0.0034 
                  Current advertising intensity (in 2001):        0.0005 
  24Table 3.  Impact of voluntary program on producer benefit with no trade in competitive 
markets 
 
ηA Participation  Rate  ∆PS ($million)  %  
      
0.0005 0.55  14  31.1 
 0.70  22  48.9 
 0.85  33  73.3 
 1.00  45   
      
0.012 0.58  48 29.0 
 0.70  80  48.4 
 0.85  118  71.5 
 1.00  165   
      
0.05 0.55  87  27.7 
 0.70  145  46.2 
 0.85  221  70.3 

















  25Table 4.  Impact of voluntary program on producer benefit with trade and 
imperfectly competitive retail and processing sectors
a 
 
 Participation  Rate  ∆PS ($million)  % 
      
θ=0.5     ζ= 0.1  0.55 12  30.0 
 0.70  19  47.5 
 0.85  29  72.5 
 1.00  40   
      
                   ζ= 0.223  0.55  8  22.2 
 0.70  14  38.9 
 0.85  20  55.6 
 1.00  36   
      
                   ζ= 0.5  0.55  4  14.3 
 0.70  7  25.0 
 0.85  10  35.7 
 1.00  28   
      
ζ= 0.223        θ= 0.178  0.55  14  30.4 
 0.70  22  47.8 
 0.85  33  72.7 
 1.00  46   
      
                   θ= 0.3  0.55  12  28.6 
 0.70  20  47.6 
 0.85  30  71.4 
 1.00  42   
a
 Results are calculated with ηA= 0.012, ηp= -0.282, ε
s














 Participation  Rate  ∆P
 (%) 
ζ= 0.1, θ = 0.178  0.55  20.2 
 0.70  16.3 
 0.85  9.5 
   
ζ= 0.223, θ = 0.3  0.55  14.0 
 0.70  11.1 
 0.85  6.4 
   
ζ= 0.5, θ = 0.5  0.55  11.4 
 0.70  8.9 
 0.85  5.0 
   
aResults are calculated with ηA= 0.012, ηp= -0.282, , ε
s
f= 0.15, and τ = 0.097 
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